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Uncertainty increases curiosity, 
but decreases happiness
Lieke L. F. van Lieshout1,2*, Floris P. de Lange1,3 & Roshan Cools1,2,3
You probably know what kind of things you are curious about, but can you also explain what it 
feels like to be curious? Previous studies have demonstrated that we are particularly curious when 
uncertainty is high and when information provides us with a substantial update of what we know. It is 
unclear, however, whether this drive to seek information (curiosity) is appetitive or aversive. Curiosity 
might correspond to an appetitive drive elicited by the state of uncertainty, because we like that 
state, or rather it might correspond to an aversive drive to reduce the state of uncertainty, because 
we don’t like it. To investigate this, we obtained both subjective valence (happiness) and curiosity 
ratings from subjects who performed a lottery task that elicits uncertainty-dependent curiosity. We 
replicated a strong main effect of outcome uncertainty on curiosity: Curiosity increased with outcome 
uncertainty, irrespective of whether the outcome represented a monetary gain or loss. By contrast, 
happiness decreased with higher outcome uncertainty. This indicates that people were more curious, 
but less happy about lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty. These findings raise the hypothesis, 
to be tested in future work, that curiosity reflects an aversive drive to reduce the unpleasant state of 
uncertainty.
Curiosity can be defined as a motivation that stimulates exploration and information  seeking1–4. Indeed, we 
consume an enormous amount of information from our surroundings. Curiosity towards obtaining that informa-
tion is generally regarded as intrinsically rewarding and  pleasurable5,6. Therefore, the state of curiosity is often 
associated with positive feelings reflecting an appetitive drive towards obtaining novel information.
However, curiosity has also been casted as “an inconsistency or a gap in our knowledge”7. This knowledge 
gap arises when somebody is confronted with a lack of information or  uncertainty8. Indeed, many (recent) stud-
ies have shown that humans and other animals are driven to obtain information to reduce uncertainty about 
the world around  us9–15. For instance, we recently showed that participants were more curious when there was 
more uncertainty about the outcome of a  lottery14–17, both for lotteries that signal gains (positive information), 
as well as for lotteries that signal losses (negative information)14,17. This was the case even though the informa-
tion signaled by the outcome was non-instrumental, so that participants could not learn or optimize behavior 
based on the perceived outcomes.
Taken together, these studies show that curiosity reflects a drive to reduce uncertainty, but what does it feel 
like to be in this state of uncertainty? Uncertainty can have aversive as well as appetitive properties. We see for 
example that humans often seek out and enjoy to engage with situations of high uncertainty, e.g. traveling to 
unknown places, carrying out scientific research with unknown outcomes, or engaging in crossword or sudoku 
puzzles. However, we also know that generally, humans do not like to be in a state of uncertainty and consider 
this state to be  aversive18–22, or even anxiety-evoking23. As a consequence, obtaining information and ending 
the unpleasant state of uncertainty might be rewarding, consistent with an information-as-reward  hypothesis6. 
This is supported by opponent-process theory of  motivation24, which states that rewards (like drugs of abuse or, 
in this case, information) can have both appetitive and aversive properties, with reward seeking reflecting both 
a motivation to maximize the presence of reward as well as a motivation to reduce the aversive state elicited by 
the absence of (e.g. withdrawal from) reward.
The idea that information can be rewarding is supported by findings in macaque monkeys indicating that 
primary rewards and information share similar behavioral and neurobiological  properties10–12. Work with human 
volunteers has also suggested that the induction of curiosity implicates brain regions linked to aversive condi-
tions, such as the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula, while curiosity relief implicates brain areas 
related to  reward20.
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The present experiments. In the current set of studies, we aimed to elucidate whether curiosity is an 
aversive or an appetitive drive by investigating whether the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty is aversive or 
appetitive. Using similar lottery tasks as in our previous  work14,15,17, we independently manipulated the uncer-
tainty and magnitude of expected value of trial outcomes, as well as the sign of the expected value (valence: 
gain versus loss). Thus, each lottery was associated with more or less uncertain gains or losses. Furthermore, we 
manipulated whether participants would see the outcome of a lottery at the end of the trial or not in a block-wise 
fashion. We did so to investigate the effects of knowing that uncertainty would be relieved versus not relieved 
at the end of a trial. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate how happy they were that the lottery 
would be played, whereas the participants of Experiment 2 were asked how curious they were about the outcome 
of the lottery.
We considered two main hypotheses. If the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty has appetitive properties, 
then greater curiosity would be accompanied by greater liking. According to this hypothesis, happiness (Experi-
ment 1) and curiosity (Experiment 2) both increase with outcome uncertainty: People would be more curious as 
well as happier about lotteries with higher outcome  uncertainty14,15,17. However, if the curiosity-triggering state 
of uncertainty has aversive properties, then there would be a dissociation between curiosity and liking. Under 
this hypothesis, people would be more curious about lotteries with higher outcome  uncertainty14,15,17, while at 
the same time less happy when lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty are played.
To preview, we demonstrated that curiosity increased with outcome uncertainty for both gains and losses, rep-
licating previous  findings14,15,17. In contrast, happiness ratings decreased with higher outcome uncertainty. These 
findings indicate that people are more curious, but less happy when outcome uncertainty is higher. Surprisingly, 
there was no effect of outcome presentation. Thus, the effects of outcome uncertainty for both experiments did 
not depend on knowing whether the outcome would be presented and curiosity would or would not be relieved.
Methods
Preregistration and data & code availability. Both experiments and their analyses were preregistered 
on the Open Science Framework (https:// osf. io/ yd9gw). All data and code used for stimulus presentation and 
analyses are freely available on the Donders Repository (https:// doi. org/ 10. 34973/ 7b75- 0r20).
Participants. Experiment 1: Thirty-seven healthy individuals participated in Experiment 1, involving hap-
piness ratings. Two participants were excluded because they falsely believed they could influence the lottery 
outcome by means of their happiness ratings. Another participant was excluded due to a technical problem 
that occurred during the experiment. The final sample of Experiment 1 consisted of thirty-four participants (21 
women, age 25.59 ± 6.46, mean ± SD).
Experiment 2: Another thirty-six healthy individuals participated in Experiment 2, involving curiosity rat-
ings. Two participants were excluded due to technical problems that occurred during the experiment. The final 
sample of Experiment 2 consisted of thirty-four participants (24 women, age 23.32 ± 3.34, mean ± SD).
For both experiments, the sample size of N = 34 included participants was chosen to be able to detect a within-
subject effect of at least medium size (d ≥ 0.5) with 80% power using a two-tailed one-sample or paired t-test. 
All participants gave written informed consent according to the declaration of Helsinki prior to participation. 
The experiments were approved by the local ethics committee (CMO Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) 
under a general ethics approval protocol (“Imaging Human Cognition”, CMO 2014/288) and were conducted 
in accordance with these guidelines.
Procedures. Both experiments used a similar lottery task (Fig. 1). Each trial started with an image of a vase 
containing twenty marbles, each of which could be either red or blue. The vases could be configured in three 
possible ways: (1) 90–10% vases: 18 marbles of one color and 2 marbles of the other color, (2) 75–25% vases: 15 
marbles of one color and 5 marbles of the other color, (3) 50–50% vases: 10 marbles of one color and 10 marbles 
of the other color. Both colors were associated with a monetary value that participants could either gain or lose. 
These monetary values varied on a trial-by-trial basis between + 10 cents and + 90 in gain trials and between − 90 
and − 10 cents in loss trials (both in steps of 10 cents). All combinations of monetary values associated with red 
and blue marbles were possible, except for combinations of the same monetary values.
We informed the participants that on each trial, one marble would be selected from the vase and that they 
would gain or lose the money associated with the selected marble. The first screen of each trial depicted the 
vase, the marbles, and the monetary values associated with the marbles (4000 ms). Next, a blank screen was pre-
sented (500 ms), followed by a response screen. On the response screen, participants of Experiment 1 indicated 
how happy they were that the presented lottery would be played (“How happy are you that this lottery will be 
played?"), whereas the participants of Experiment 2 indicated how curious they were about the presented lottery 
(“How curious are you about the outcome of this lottery?”). Participants indicated their happiness (Experiment 
1; Fig. 1A) or curiosity (Experiment 2; Fig. 1B) on a sliding bar (visual analogue scale) ranging from 0 to 10. On 
this scale, a value of 0 means “not happy at all” in Experiment 1 and “not curious at all” in Experiment 2 and a 
value of 10 means “very happy” in Experiment 1 and “very curious” in Experiment 2. This response screen was 
presented until the participant gave a response, with a limit of 10 s. The participants used a button box to adjust 
the position of the bar. The bar would always start in the middle (consistent with a happiness rating or a curios-
ity rating of 5), and participants could use their right index finger to slide the bar to the left, their right middle 
finger to slide the bar to the right and their right little finger to confirm and save the response. A blank screen 
(500 ms), and an outcome screen (2000 ms) followed the response screen. When the outcome was presented, the 
outcome screen depicted the vase, the marbles and monetary values associated with the marbles again, together 
with a box in which they saw the colored marble that was selected and the amount of money they gained or lost 
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in that trial. When the outcome was not presented, the participants saw a black marble instead of a colored mar-
ble and question marks at the location of the monetary value. This way, the amount of visual input was roughly 
comparable between presented and not presented outcomes. Participants would always see the outcome of the 
lottery in half of the task blocks, whereas they would not see the outcome of the lottery in the other half of the 
task blocks. This manipulation was instructed explicitly before the start of each block and enabled us to investigate 
whether happiness or curiosity would be a function of knowing that the outcome would or would not presented 
and uncertainty would be either relieved or not relieved. After a trial ended, there was a blank screen (jittered 
duration, 1000–2000 ms, uniformly distributed), after which the next trial started.
Importantly, participants were explicitly instructed that they could not influence the outcome of each lottery. 
The only thing participants had to do was to indicate how happy they were that the presented lottery would be 
played (Experiment 1) or how curious they were about the outcome of the presented lottery (Experiment 2), given 
that the outcome would or would not be presented at the end of the trial. In both experiments, participants were 
told that a marble would be selected on every trial and that they would always gain or lose the money associated 
with that marble, regardless of outcome presentation. The money they gained or lost in every trial would be 
summed and the sum of money would be added to or subtracted from the money they earned for participation.
For both experiments, the participants completed a total of 408 trials (204 gain trials and 204 loss trials). 
Both gain and loss trials were divided in 102 trials during which the outcome was presented and 102 trials 
during which the outcome was not presented. In turn, each vase configuration was presented on 136 occasions 
(34 times for each vase configuration). The trials were divided in 8 blocks of 52 trials. During 4 of these blocks, 
the outcome would always be presented to the participants, whereas the outcome would never be presented in 
the other 4 blocks. The blocks were pseudo-randomized such that participants would never get the same block 
type more than 2 times in a row. Within the blocks, the trials were pseudo-randomized, such that participants 
were never presented with more than six gain trials, six loss trials or six trials with the same vase configuration 
in a row. After each block, the participants were instructed to take a short break if necessary. The experiment 
lasted ~ 105 min in total.
Experimental design. We investigated whether there was a relationship between the main effects of out-
come valence (gain/loss), outcome presentation (yes/no), outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value and the 
happiness ratings (Experiment 1) or the curiosity ratings (Experiment 2). Furthermore, we investigated whether 
the effects of outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value and outcome presentation (yes /no) on happiness 
or curiosity differed between the gain and loss trials. This was done by assessing the significance of interaction-
effects between outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value, outcome presentation (yes/no) and outcome 
valence (gain/loss). Likewise, we investigate whether the effects of outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value 
Figure 1.  Schematic depiction of the happiness task (a; Experiment 1) and the curiosity task (b; Experiment 2). 
(A) Schematic depiction of a gain trial in the happiness experiment (Experiment 1). Participants saw a screen on 
which a vase with 20 red and blue marbles was depicted and the monetary values associated with the marbles. 
These monetary values could either both be positive (in gain trials, depicted here) or both be negative (in loss 
trials). One marble was selected randomly from the vase and participants would actually gain or lose the money 
associated with the selected marble. Next, participants indicated how happy they were that the selected lottery 
would be played on a sliding bar (visual analogue scale). In half of the task blocks, participants would always see 
the outcome, and in the other task blocks they would never see the outcome. Importantly, participants could 
not influence which marble would be selected and they were awarded the money associated with the selected 
marble, regardless of outcome presentation. (B) Schematic depiction of a loss trial in the curiosity experiment 
(Experiment 2). The task was the same as in Experiment 1, but instead of giving a happiness response, the 
participants had to indicate how curious they were about the outcome. See “Methods” section (Procedure) for 
details on the timing of the experiments.
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and outcome valence (gain/loss) on happiness or curiosity differed between trials during which the outcome was 
presented and trials during which the outcome was not presented. This was done by assessing the significance of 
the interaction-effects between outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value, outcome valence (gain/loss) and 
outcome presentation (yes/no).
In order to do so, a value of outcome uncertainty and expected value was calculated for every trial (X) as 
follows:
Here, xi is the monetary value associated with marble (i) and pi the probability that this marble will be drawn. 
Outcome uncertainty (Eq. 1) reflects the variance or spread of the possible outcomes in trial (X) and expected 
value (Eq. 2) reflects the mean expected reward for trial (X).
It should be noted that we used a different calculation for outcome uncertainty in one of our previous  studies15, 
and we had preregistered to use that calculation of outcome uncertainty in the current manuscript. However, 
given that both metrics are virtually identical, and variance is a more common measure of  uncertainty25,26, we 
decided to calculate outcome uncertainty as variance instead.
It should also be noted that the expected value is always positive in a gain trial and always negative in a 
loss trial. To be able to compare the effects of expected value between the gain and loss trials, we converted the 
expected values by taking the absolute values such that − 90 cents in a loss trial would be treated the same as + 90 
cents in a gain trial etc. However, the metric of interest here is the effect of reward magnitude (signed expected 
value) on curiosity, which is reflected in the interaction between outcome valence (gain/loss) and absolute 
expected value.
Statistical analyses. The data were analyzed using a combination of mixed effects modeling using in R (R 
Core Team, 2013; RRID:SCR_001905; see “Results” section) and classical repeated measure ANOVAs in SPSS 
(RRID:SCR_002865; see Supplementary Material). This allowed us to verify the robustness of the results and to 
demonstrate that our conclusions do not depend on the analytical framework employed. The analyses were per-
formed as preregistered, except that instead of running Univariate General Linear Models (GLMs) on the data, 
we analyzed the data with repeated measures ANOVAs (see Supplementary Material). The motivation for this 
change in analytical strategy was to be consistent with our previous study using a similar  design14 and because 
memory requirements of the univariate GLM model precluded this analysis type within SPSS with the current 
data set.
Analyses using the BRMS package in R. We performed the primary analyses using the brm function of the 
BRMS  package27 in R. The analyses were performed as preregistered. The main model of Experiment 1 included 
“Happiness Rating” (z-scored) as dependent variable, whereas the main model of Experiment 2 included “Curi-
osity Rating” (z-scored) as dependent variable. The main models included main effects of “outcome valence 
(gain/loss)”, “outcome presentation (yes/no)”, “outcome uncertainty” and “expected value (absolute)” as fixed 
effects. Additionally, the main models included interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and 
“outcome presentation (yes/no)”, between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “outcome uncertainty”, between 
“outcome valence (gain/loss)” and “expected value (absolute)”, between “outcome presentation (yes/no)” and 
“outcome uncertainty” and between “outcome presentation (yes/no)” and “expected value (absolute)” as fixed 
effects. The main models included a full random effects  structure28,29, meaning that a random intercept and ran-
dom slopes for all effects were included per participant. The predictors for outcome uncertainty and expected 
value (absolute) were mean centered and scaled. We used the default priors of the brms package (Cauchy priors 
and LKJ priors for correlation  parameters27). The main models were fit using four chains with 10,000 iterations 
each (5000 warm up) and inspected for convergence. Coefficients were deemed statistically significant if the 
associated 95% posterior credible intervals were non-overlapping with zero.
If the interaction effects between “outcome valence (gain/loss)” and either “outcome presentation (yes/no)”, 
“outcome uncertainty” or “expected value (absolute)” were significant in the main model, we used the brm 
function of the BRMS  package27 to model the gain and loss trials separately. The models were identical to the 
main model, except that “outcome valence (gain/loss)” as well as its interactions with the other factors were not 
included. If any of the interaction effects between “outcome presentation (yes/no)” and “outcome uncertainty” 
or “expected value (absolute)” were significant in these additional models, we modeled the trials in which the 
outcome was presented and not presented separately.
Similarly, if the interaction effects between “outcome presentation (yes/no)” and either “outcome valence 
(gain/loss)”, “outcome uncertainty” or “expected value (absolute)” were significant in the main model, we used 
the brm function of the BRMS  package27 to model trials in which the outcome was presented and not presented 
separately. If any of the interaction effects between “outcome valence (yes/no)” and “outcome uncertainty” or 
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Data visualization. For the data visualization, we divided the levels of outcome uncertainty in eight percentile 
bins per condition, such that the 1st bin roughly represents the 1/8th of the lowest levels of outcome uncertainty, 
the 2nd bin the 1/8th–2/8th of the lowest levels, etc. The same was done for the values of absolute expected value. 
For each bin, a mean happiness score (Experiment 1) or mean curiosity score (Experiment 2) was calculated 
per participant per condition. Next, these mean scores were averaged across participants and the standard error 
of the mean (SEM) was calculated for each outcome uncertainty and absolute expected value bin of the gain/
loss and outcome presented/not presented conditions separately. Least squares lines illustrate the effects. These 
results can be seen in Fig. 2A for the happiness ratings and Fig. 2B for the curiosity ratings.
Furthermore, to illustrate to what extent individual participants showed sensitivity to outcome uncertainty, 
we calculated the mean happiness ratings (Experiment 1, Fig. 3A) and curiosity ratings (Experiment 2, Fig. 3A) 
for high outcome uncertainty and low outcome uncertainty for the gain (Fig. 3A, B left panels) and loss trials 
(Fig. 3A, B right panels) separately per participant.
Figure 2.  Results of the happiness experiment (a; Experiment 1) and the curiosity experiment (b; Experiment 
2). In both panels, the x-axis depicts percentile bins of the values of outcome uncertainty (left) and the absolute 
values of expected value (right) for both gains (in red; magenta) and losses (in blue; cyan) and for trials in 
which the outcome was presented (in red; blue) and not presented (in magenta; cyan). The y-axis depicts the 
mean happiness ratings (A) or mean curiosity ratings (B) for each percentile of outcome uncertainty and 
absolute expected value per condition. For other details of the data visualization, see “Methods” section—Data 
Visualization. (A) Experiment 1 showed that happiness was higher for gains than for losses. There was a small 
but significant decrease in happiness with outcome uncertainty, such that participants were happier about 
lotteries when outcome uncertainty was lower. There was a monotonic increase of happiness with absolute 
expected value in the gain trials and a monotonic decrease with absolute expected value in loss trials, such that 
people were happier about trials with higher wins and lower losses. (B) Experiment 2 showed that curiosity was 
higher for gains than for losses. In contrast with Experiment 1, curiosity increased monotonically with outcome 
uncertainty in the gain and the loss context, such that participants were more curious about the outcome of 
lotteries when outcome uncertainty was higher. Curiosity increased with absolute expected value in the gain 
trials, but there was no effect of absolute expected value in the loss trials.
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Results
Experiment 1. As expected, participants were happier about gain lotteries compared with loss lotteries 
(Fig. 2A; BRMS: 95% CI [0.84, 0.92]). Happiness ratings were not different between blocks in which people 
would either see or not see the outcome of the lottery (BRMS: 95% CI [− 0.011, 0.012]). There was no main 
effect of absolute expected value (BRMS: 95% CI [− 0.010, 0.0067]), but there was an interaction between abso-
lute expected value and outcome valence (BRMS: 95% CI [0.25, 0.30]). This interaction was due to participants 
being happier with higher gains compared with lower gains (BRMS: 95% CI [0.25, 0.30]), and with lower losses 
compared with higher losses (BRMS: 95% CI [− 0.30, − 0.24]).
Furthermore, there was a main effect of outcome uncertainty (BRMS: 95% CI [− 0.038, − 0.0095]), such that 
participants were happier about trials with low compared with high outcome uncertainty. We found a small but 
significant interaction effect between outcome uncertainty and outcome valence when analyzing the data with 
Figure 3.  Individual variability in the effects of outcome uncertainty on happiness (a) and curiosity (b). (A) 
Panel A depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome uncertainty on happiness, as a function 
of outcome valence (left: gains in red, right: losses in blue). In both graphs, the x-axis depicts mean happiness 
for low outcome uncertainty and the y-axis depicts mean happiness for high outcome uncertainty. Every dot 
depicts one participant. The majority of the dots are below the diagonal, indicating that participants were 
happier when lotteries with low compared with high outcome uncertainty were played. This effect was mainly 
present for the loss trials (blue, right graph) and to a lesser extent for the gain trials (red, left graph). (B) Panel B 
depicts individual data points representing effects of outcome uncertainty on curiosity, as a function of outcome 
valence (left: gains in red, right: losses in blue). Other conventions are as for panel A. In contrast with panel A, 
the majority of the dots are above the diagonal, indicating that participants are more curious about the outcome 
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the BRMS package in R (BRMS: 95% CI [0.0002, 0.025]), but this was not the case when analyzing the data 
with a repeated measures ANOVA (see Supplementary Material). However, when we did analyze the data of 
the gain and loss trials separately, we found a significant effect of outcome uncertainty on happiness in the loss 
trials (BRMS: 95% CI [− 0.05, − 0.02]), but not in the gain trials (BRMS: 95% CI [− 0.04, 0.013]). Therefore, we 
conclude that the negative effect of outcome uncertainty on happiness is particularly present in the loss trials 
(Fig. 3A), although we acknowledge that the evidence for differential effects of outcome uncertainty between 
gain and loss trials is weak.
There were no interaction effects between outcome valence, outcome uncertainty, absolute expected value and 
outcome presentation (yes/no), indicating that none of the reported effects depended on outcome presentation.
Experiment 2. Replicating our previous  study14, participants were more curious about the outcome of gain 
compared with loss lotteries (Fig. 2B; BRMS: 95% CI [0.12, 0.33]). However, curiosity ratings were not different 
between blocks in which people would either see or not see the outcome of the lottery (BRMS: 95% CI [− 0.052, 
0.074]). Consistent with our previous  study14, we found a robust effect of outcome uncertainty, such that par-
ticipants were more curious about lotteries with higher compared with lower outcome uncertainty (BRMS: 95% 
CI [0.27, 0.43]). There was no interaction between outcome valence and outcome uncertainty (BRMS: 95% CI 
[− 0.024, 0.006]), indicating that this was the case for gain as well as for loss trials (Fig. 3B).
We found a significant interaction between outcome valence and absolute expected value (BRMS: 95% CI 
[0.002, 0.059]). This interaction was due to participants being more curious about high compared with low abso-
lute expected value in gain trials (BRMS: 95% CI [0.026, 0.11]), but not in loss trials (BRMS: 95% CI [− 0.035, 
0.054]). Also in Experiment 2, there were no interaction effects between outcome valence, outcome uncertainty, 
absolute expected value and outcome presentation (yes/no), indicating that none of the reported effects was 
dependent on outcome presentation.
Discussion
We investigated whether curiosity reflects an appetitive or an aversive drive. To this end, we obtained both 
subjective valence/happiness ratings (Experiment 1) and curiosity ratings (Experiment 2) from subjects who 
performed a lottery task that elicits uncertainty-dependent curiosity. We found that curiosity robustly increased 
with outcome  uncertainty14–17, but that happiness decreased with outcome uncertainty. In other words: people are 
more curious, but less happy when outcome uncertainty is higher. Surprisingly, the effects of outcome uncertainty 
on happiness and curiosity did not depend on outcome presentation (that is, knowing whether curiosity would 
be relieved or not). Together, the current findings indicate that curiosity ratings are higher for states that make 
people less happy. These findings raise the hypothesis, to be tested in future work, that curiosity represents an 
aversive drive to reduce the unpleasant state of uncertainty.
Whereas we replicated the finding that curiosity increases with outcome uncertainty for both gains and 
 losses14,15,17, we found that happiness decreased with outcome uncertainty for gains and losses. Although the 
negative effect of outcome uncertainty on happiness seems to be smaller than the positive effect of outcome 
uncertainty on curiosity, both effects are present in the majority of participants (Fig. 3A,B). These distinct 
effects of outcome uncertainty on happiness and curiosity are in line with findings showing that humans gener-
ally consider the state of uncertainty to be  aversive18–22, and even anxiety-evoking23. Thus, uncertainty drives 
us to seek information in order to reduce the disliked state of ignorance. Although these findings support the 
hypothesis that curiosity is an aversive drive, they do not discard the information-as-reward hypothesis, accord-
ing to which information can have appetitive properties. In fact, previous fMRI studies have indicated that self-
reported curiosity has been associated with brain activity in the caudate  nucleus30, the midbrain and the nucleus 
 accumbens31. These are structures that are more generally activated by reward anticipation, suggesting that 
curiosity has appetitive properties. All in all, these findings might be in line with the opponent-process theory 
of  motivation24. According to this theory, information seeking is likely driven by a combination of a motivation 
to reduce the aversive state elicited by the absence of information (uncertainty), as well as by a motivation to 
maximize the presence of information.
As expected, both curiosity and happiness were greater for gains than for losses. This was expected because 
our prior  work14,17, as well as other  work32, has shown that people exhibit a preference for positive versus negative 
belief updating. As in the current experiment, obtaining information in those studies was non-instrumental, 
meaning that there was no way of maximizing rewards or increasing task performance by means of exploration. 
In these situations, curiosity is higher for gains compared with losses, possibly because it allows the participants 
to maximize the positive affective state associated with that they have  won33. Additionally, these effects of outcome 
valence did not interact with outcome uncertainty. These findings strengthen prior observations that there are 
multiple mechanisms underlying  curiosity14,17,34,35, which might operate independent from each  other14,36. One 
of these mechanisms is related to an (aversive) drive to reduce uncertainty. The other mechanism is related to 
processing reward context (savouring): we are both more curious and happier about lotteries containing gains 
compared with losses.
It should be noted, that our findings seemingly contradict prior work on epistemic curiosity using trivia 
 questions30,31. That work suggested that individuals are mostly curious about information of intermediate levels 
of confidence compared with questions about which they were very confident or not confident at all to already 
know the  answer30,37. Other studies using trivia questions even demonstrated that curiosity is strongest when one 
feels close to filling a knowledge  gap38–40. These findings contrast with our observation of a linear relationship 
between uncertainty and curiosity. However, it might reflect that participants in previous work were not curi-
ous about questions with highest uncertainty (i.e. lowest confidence), because they were simply not interested 
in the topics of these questions. In other words, there might be a correlation between one’s disinterest and one’s 
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curiosity about the subject, confounding the relationship between curiosity and uncertainty. Here, this confound 
was avoided by experimentally manipulating outcome uncertainty in a quantitative and controlled manner.
Limitations and future directions. Surprisingly, we found no effect of outcome presentation. This indi-
cates that it did not matter for participants whether they would be presented with the outcome or not, and 
whether uncertainty would be relieved or not. This was the case for both the subjective valence/happiness rat-
ings (Experiment 1) as well as for the curiosity ratings (Experiment 2). These findings are especially surprising 
given recent findings demonstrating that people experienced less positive affect when the time to close the 
information gap was  longer41. Furthermore, under the information-as-reward hypothesis, one would expect 
that people would be happier when they know that the information gap would be closed by being presented the 
outcome, compared with situations in which they know that the information gap would not be closed. In both 
experiments, participants were explicitly instructed that they had to give their happiness or curiosity rating given 
that the outcome would be presented or not. However, it might be the case that the happiness question was too 
decoupled from outcome presentation, because the question was focused on the lottery itself (“How happy are 
you that this lottery will be played?”) instead of on the outcome of the lottery. Another possible explanation is 
that participants were already cognitively overloaded with processing outcome uncertainty as well as outcome 
valence and the expected value of a lottery. These values varied on a trial-to-trial basis, whereas outcome presen-
tation varied in a block-wise fashion instead. Perhaps it was easier for people to take the within-block manipula-
tions into account, since they are different every trial and their changes are therefore more salient. Future work 
might attempt to vary outcome presentation on a trial-to-trial basis, to test the hypothesis that curiosity reflects 
an aversive drive to reduce the unpleasant state of uncertainty.
The happiness ratings (Experiment 1) and the curiosity ratings (Experiment 2) are obtained from two separate 
groups of participants. It is therefore not possible to directly compare the effects of outcome uncertainty on hap-
piness with the effects of outcome uncertainty on curiosity. We made the decision for conducting two separate 
experiments, because we aimed to avoid demand characteristics related to letting participants give more than 
one rating for similar lotteries (i.e. they could adjust their curiosity rating to their happiness rating or vice versa). 
Furthermore, we see in Experiment 2 as well as in our previous  work14–17 that the relationship between outcome 
uncertainty and curiosity is robust and consistent over participants. It is therefore safe to assume that the partici-
pants in the happiness experiment, who overall show that they are less happy when lotteries with higher outcome 
uncertainty are played, would at the same time be more curious about lotteries with higher outcome uncertainty.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the happiness scale ranged from “not happy at all” to “very happy”. As 
such, it is not clear whether participants who indicate to be not happy at all, actually consider the lottery to be 
aversive. It might also indicate that they are simply less happy about these compared with other lotteries, which 
would be accompanied by more neutral or indifferent feelings about the lottery. Future studies could measure 
aversion more directly, by ranging the scale from “very aversive” to “very happy”, with the neutral point meaning 
“not aversive nor happy”. In addition, future studies might leverage the notion that more neutral affect should be 
accompanied by a reduced autonomic response, measured by pupil  dilation42,43 or skin  conductance44.
Conclusion. These studies advance our understanding of the psychological mechanisms of curiosity, by 
raising the hypothesis, to be tested in future work, that the curiosity-triggering state of uncertainty reflects an 
aversive drive. This aversive drive might well go hand in hand with an appetitive drive to maximize information.
Data availability
The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available in the Donders Repository 
(https:// doi. org/ 10. 34973/ 7b75- 0r20). Both experiments and their analyses were preregistered on the Open Sci-
ence Framework (https:// osf. io/ yd9gw).
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